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Drawing on the traditional view that knowledge essentially concerns 
~ell-done rational inquiry, many epistemologists take episternic justifica­
tron to be extensionally equivalent to episternic rationality. 1 Accordingly, 
to h.ave propositional epistemic justification is to have- one's total epis­
temtc condition considered-good truth-indicating reasons with respect 
to the ~roposition, and to have doxastic episternic justification is to have a 
~oxasttc attitude with respect to a proposition based on good truth-indicat­
Ing reasons.2 Michael Bergmann (2006) has introduced a new theory of 
doxastic justification, which he claims analyzes the very same epistemic 
property that has concerned leading evidentialists or intemalists, whose 
theories plausibly concern truth-indicating reasons for belief In what 
:oii?ws I reveal that Bergmann's theory is inapt to secure the suggested 
JUstification-rationality equivalence, a result that provides reason to deny 
th~t Bergmann's theory is about the same property that has concerned the 
evtdentialists or internalists that he discusses. 
Bergmann explicitly takes himself to be discussing the same epistemic 
property that many leading evidentialists or intemalists treat in their theo­
ries ofepistemic justification: 
... my purpose in explaining how I use the term 'justification' is 
not to strike a conciliatory note by saying: 'while externalism is 
true ofthe sort of justification/have in mind, intemalism is true 
of the sort of justification internalists hav~ in ~ind': In.deed, 
I think the sort of justification I'll be highh~tmg... !ust IS the 
sort of justification in which many intemahsts are mterested. 
(Bergmann, 2006, p. 4) 
... the justification I'm interested in was shown by ':fettier t? be 
insufficient for warrant.J Thus, justification, as I wtll be thmk­
ing of it, is more objective than subjective deontologi~al ~usti­
fication but still insufficient for warrant.... The sort ofJUStifica­
tion I have in mind ... is viewed by most as necessary but not 
sufficient for warrant. It certainly isn't the same thing as war­
rant. (Bergmann, 2006, p. 6, Bergmann's emphasis removed) 
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... it is the sort of doxastic justification in which evidentialists 
like Conee, Feldman, and [Bruce] Russell are interested. (Berg­
man, 2006, p. 6) 
Inaddition to Earl Conee, Richard Feldman, and Bruce Russell, it is clear 
frorn Bergmann's discussion that the extended list (ofthose epistemolo­
gists who are interested in the sort ofepistemic justification that Bergmann 
takes himselfto be interested in) also includes (at least) Laurence Bon­
Jour, Evan Fales:· Richard Fumerton, Timothy McGrew, and Paul Moser. 
· . 	'.An these evide~iialists or epistemic intemalists have in common the tra­
ditional view, \\:hi~h reaches back at least to the Socrates ofPlato's Meno, 
that the kind ofjustification that is necessary for knowledge requires hav­
ing reason to believe.4 Because they all take epistemic justification (here­
after, 'justification') essentially to depend on one's having good, objective, 
truth-indicating reasons, and because Bergmann claims to be analyzing 
the same concept with which they are concerned, it is both fair and philo­
sophically worthwhile to consider how apt Bergmann's proper function 
justification theory (JPF below) is at securing an intimate link between jus­
tification and epistemic rationality. 
JPF: S's belief B is justified iff (i) S does not take B to be de­
feated and (ii) the cognitive faculties producing Bare (a) func­
tioning properly, (b) truth-aimed and (c) reliable in the envi­
ronments for which they were 'designed'. (Bergmann, 2006, 
p. 	133) 
My investigation depends in part on the fact that JPF entails the denial 
ofwhat Bergmann calls "Necessity." 
Necessity: the [ epistemic] fittingness of doxastic response B 
to evidence E is an essential property of that response to that 
evidence. (Bergmann, 2006, p. 112) 
Bergmann denies Necessity because he thinks that the epistemic fitting­
ness of an input to a belief-forming process can be due to a contingent 
feature ofthat input. To illustrate his idea, he discusses two different pos­
sible "design plans," where a design plan is the complete description of 
the natural way of functioning for a cognizer (Bergmann, 2006, Ch. 5). 
According to "the human design plan," cognizers function properly when 
they believe B 1: there is a smallish hard round object in my hand, as an 
unlearned causal response to having "main evidence" ME1: tactile sensa­
tions ofthe type you experience when you grab a billiard ball. According 
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to "design plan B," cognizers function properly when they believe B I as 
an unlearned causal response to having "main evidence" ME2: olfactory 
sensations of the type you experience when you smell a meadow full of 
flowers. 
His argument against Necessity in a nutshell: (i) there is nothing about 
the ME2-to-B I process that makes it "intrinsically less suitable (as a natu­
ral unlearned process for a cognizer to undergo)" than the ME1-to-Bl pro­
cess (Bergmann, 2006, p. 119); hence, (ii) it is just as doxastica/ly fitting 
for the cognizer under design plan B to form B 1 as described as it is for 
the cognizer under the human design plan to form BI as described; hence, 
(iii) the epistemic fittingness of an input to a belief-forming process can 
be due to a contingent feature (i.e., the design plan, which can vary across 
cognizers) of that input. 
For the present purpose, we should focus on the inference from (ii) to 
(iii) with an eye to discerning whether the doxastic fittingness mentioned 
in (ii) is sufficient for the kind of epistemic fittingness-mentioned in 
(iii)-that is suitable for epistemically rational belief. To be fair, our tests 
should bear in mind the details ofJ .... which Bergmann says is consistent 
, Pr-
Wlth, and partly motivated by, his denial ofNecessity. Consider the fol­
lowing test cases. 
Suppose that there exists a powerful and knowledgeable Humean 'in­
fant deity' (Zed), who has created cognizers who are approximately as 
intelligent as humans. 5 Although Zed is an immature deity whose created 
World falls far short ofa best possible world, Zed, having recently been in­
furiated by the deceptions ofhis older siblings, has developed apassion for 
honesty and truth. Consequently, Zed has designed his cognizers reliably 
to believe truths in various circumstances of the environment in which he 
has placed them. And, due to his youthful vanity, Zed has designed those 
cognizers such that their happiness depends in part on their believing that 
Zed exists. Accordingly, the 'Z-design plan' calls for Zed's created cog­
nizers to form belief B2 (there exists a powerful creator, andflying mon­
keys guard the approach to the wicked witch of the west:r house), as an 
inference from their beliefthatp (I'm experiencing ME2) and their belief 
that q (ifp, then there exists a powerful creator andflying monkeys guard 
the approach to the wicked witch ofthe wests house). The cognizers are 
designed to believe p and q upon physical contact with another Z-designed 
cognizer, and they are designed not to notice that they have no reason to 
believe that appreciating the content of q's antecedent provides a good 
reason to believe q's consequent (in contrast with the fact that they are 
designed to appreciate, say, that Rex is running unaided gives them reason 
to believe that Rex has legs); accordingly, they don't take themselves to 
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have a defeater for q (just as it is withp). Also, the cognizers have no rea­
son to believe that flying monkeys guard the approach to the wicked witch 
of the west's house (i.e., it does not seem to them that they have sensory 
experience of flying monkeys, or that they have heard testimony about 
flying monkeys, etc.). Nevertheless, Zed has a reason for the cognizers to 
believe in flying monkeys and a wicked witch's house: such beliefs are de­
signed to have a salutary role in their unconscious dreams, providing some 
psychological aid in their struggles against the hardship and suffering that 
Zed predicts they will endure due to details ofthe particular world Zed has 
designed and created. Suppose further that p, q, and the proposition ex­
pressed by BZ are all true in the world envisioned whenever a cognizer in 
that world believes those propositions. Having frequent contact with oth­
ers, these cognizers frequently engage in a belief-forming inference from 
(p and q) to the content ofB2, forming B2 on the basis of that inference. 
The cognitive faculties producing those beliefs are successfully aimed at 
truth, for those faculties are likely to produce true beliefs when operating 
in the environment for which they were designed. 
Suppose that one Z-designed cognizer, Spam, has just formed B2 as 
described and that, for reasons discussed above, Spam's relevant cognitive 
faculties are functioning as designed, are truth-aimed, are reliable in the 
environments for which they were designed, and Spam does not take B2 
to be defeated. JrF implies that Spam's beliefB2, as well as his beliefthat 
p and his belief that q, are epistemically justified. 
But, are they epistemically rational? Clearly, Spam lacks a good truth­
indicating reason to believe that q. Spam's method in forming that belief 
is intellectually poor with respect to the aim of rational inquiry, for it has 
nothing to do with Spam's reasons, even if he cannot help it and it gets 
him onto the truth. No doubt Spam's belief that q is the result of some 
kind ofdoxastic proper function, for Spam forms that belief just as he was 
designed to do; but, it does not follow, nor is it at all plausible, that the 
belief is rational (i.e., "of or based on reasoning or reason"),6 much less 
epistemically rational. And, although Spam's belief B2, being the result 
ofan inference, can be said to have been formed on the basis ofreasoning, 
B2 is epistemically irrational, since Spam literally has no reason to believe 
the content ofB2.7 
Now consider another Z-designed cognizer, Bam, who comes to re­
alize that she has no reason to think that the truth of q's consequent is 
connected to the truth of q's antecedent; and, as a result, Bam suspends 
judgment on not-q and, on that basis, suspends judgment on the content of 
B2. It seems that Bam is reasoning well, and this suggests that her doxas­
tic attitude toward the proposition expressed by B2 is epistemically ratio­
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nal.8 Now, Bergmann would insist that we also consider whether Bam's 
realization is consistent with the defeater system part of the Z-design plan 
(see (Bergmann, 2006, chap. 6, especially pp. 170-172)). So, suppose 
that Bam's realization is not consistent with the Z-design plan's defeater 
system. That defeater system is designed not to produce suspension of 
judgment with respect to not-q in Bam's environment, and it is designed 
not to produce suspension of judgment on the content of B2 in Bam's 
environment. It follows that Bam is not functioning as designed. Thus, 
her doxastic attitudes toward q and the content of B2 are, according to 
JPF' unjustified. Nevertheless, these doxastic attitudes strike us as entirely 
reasonable, and I do not think that this is due to human species chauvin­
ism. I think it is due to an intuition motivating Necessity. Necessity tracks 
our sense that there are essentially good ways ofreasoning and essentially 
bad ways of reasoning, from the point of view concerned with epistemic 
rationality. The good ways ofreasoning do not become bad ifone's design 
plan fails to sanction them, and the bad ways of reasoning do not become 
good ifone's design plan sanctions them. But, since JPF implies otherwise, 
it is inapt at securing an extensional equivalence ofepistemically rational 
beliefand epistemically justified belief. 
I do not mean to suggest that all the evidentialist or intemalist theo­
ries that Bergmann discusses are equally apt at securing the equivalence 
at issue. However, since they are committed to Necessity (or something 
very similar) and because they all have to do with what can plausibly be 
regarded as having reasons, they are much better suited to secure a satisfy­
ing relation between justification and rationality than is JPF" 
In any case, the evidentialist or intemalist theories all share an idea 
that their proponents think of as central, and thus indispensable, to their 
respective theories: one's holding a justified belief essentially depends on 
one's having a good, truth-indicating reason with respect to the believed 
proposition. But, as I have shown, Bergmann's proper functionjustifica-
tion theory does not entail that one's holding a justified belief depends on 
one's having a good, truth-indicating reason. This result provides reason 
to deny Bergmann's claim that his theory is concerned with the sa11_1e prop­
erty with which the evidentialists or intemalists that Bergmann dtscusses 
are concemed.9 
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Notes 

1 The extensional equivalence amounts to the claim that every instance of 
epistemically justified belief is an instance of epistemically rational belief, and 
vice versa. Although among the evidentialists or intemalists that Bergmann dis­
cusses there is some divergence with respect to the standard of justification that 
they discuss (e.g., some are concerned with knowledge-level justification, where­
as others are concerned with a lower standard of justification yielding positive 
epistemic status), they tend to have in common the view that whatever various 
standards there are for epistemic justification track whatever various standards 
there are for epistemic rationality. The basic idea is that the better epistemic jus­
tification one has, the better truth-indicating reason(s) one has, and vice versa. 
2 These claims are consistent with the plausible view that suspending judg­
ment can be the doxastic attitude that is epistemically justified for a person; for, in 
such a case, one's good truth-indicating reasons for a propositionp are roughly on 
a par with one's good truth-indicating reasons for not-p. 
3 Bergmann follows Plantinga in defining warrant as that which turns true 
belief into knowledge, and Bergmann follows many ofthe paradigm evidentialists 
or internalists that he discusses in thinking that knowledge is justified true belief 
plus the satisfaction of a condition to deal with Gettier cases. 
4 According to Plato's Meno [97e] Socrates says that the difference between 
true belief and knowledge is "[giving] an account ofthe reason why" (Plato, 2002, 
p. 90). 
s See Hume (1993, Part V), where his commentary suggests that this much 
of my imaginary creation-and-design story is consistent with what we know of 
our own world and its human cognizers. 
6 This is the first definition or 'rational' in the Oxford English Reference 
Dictionary. See Pearsall and Trumble (1996, p. 1198). 
7 Spam may feel impelled to believe the content of B2, but a feeling of 
impulsion is not itself a truth-indicating reason. For discussion of this point, see 
Long (forthcoming), Conee (1998), and Conee and Feldman (2004, pp. 64-67). 
8 For other examples that trade on a distinction between proper function and 
good epistemic function, see Feldman (2003, pp. 103-104), whose examples are 
directed at Plantinga's reliabilist proper function theory. 
9 I do not claim here to have proven that Bergmann's theory concerns a 
different property than the one with which evidentialists or internalists have been 
concerned. Anything approaching proofwould require providing reason to think 
that some nonexternalist theory ofjustification is theoretically preferable to Berg­
mann's externalist theory, taking into account Bergmann's objections to nonexter­
nalist theories. This is a task I take up in my "Mentalism Vmdicated (and a Super­
Blooper Problem for Proper Function Justification)" (currently unpublished). 
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